The use of belief functions has recently been advocated as an alternative to the use of probability functions in order to represent quantified beliefs. Such a proposal lacked justification. We present a set of requirements that justify the use of belief functions. The assessment of the validity of these requirements provides a tool for assessing the relative value of normative models of subjective behaviors.
After summarizing the necessary technical information, we present the proposed requirements together with a few illustrative examples by way of illustration. Proofs are omitted 2 . We focus essentially on the rationality constraints that underpin the requirements and that really justify them.
The credibility domain.
The aim of this paper is to develop the mathematical structure of a function Cr, temporarily called a credibility function that quantifies Your beliefs that the actual world belongs to such or such subset of possible worlds. Beliefs can equivalently be allocated to 'propositions', to the subsets of worlds that denote the propositions or to events. Our presentation is based on the possible worlds approach (Bradley and Swartz, 1979, Ruspini, 1986) .
The strength of the beliefs entertained by You at time t is defined relatively to a given evidential corpus (EC t Y ), i.e., the set of evidence in Your mind at time t. This EC t Y is equivalent to the 'background knowledge' used by the Bayesians, and intuitively just means 'all You know'. Only one belief holder, You, is considered in this paper, and time t is unique except when belief revision is studied.
The propositional space.
Let L be a finite propositional language, supplemented by the tautology and the contradiction, denoted T and ⊥, respectively, and closed under the usual Boolean connectives ¬, ∨ and ∧ . Let Ω be the set of worlds that correspond to the interpretations of L and built so that no two worlds denote logically equivalent propositions. For any proposition X in L, let "X' " Ω be the set of worlds identified by X (i.e., those worlds where X is true).
Let ℜ be a Boolean algebra of subsets of Ω (thus closed under union, intersection, complement, and containing Ω and Ø). Let At(ℜ) be the set of atoms of the algebra ℜ, i.e., the non-empty elements of ℜ whose intersection with any element of ℜ is either themselves or the empty set. The atoms of ℜ are the elements of a partition of Ω. When ℜ is the power set 2 Ω of Ω, the atoms of ℜ are the singletons of Ω.
We assume that among the worlds of Ω a particular one, denoted ω 0 , corresponds to the actual world. You do not know at t which world is ω 0 . You can only express Your beliefs at t that the actual world ω 0 does or does not belong to various subsets of worlds. By definition the actual world ω 0 is an element of Ω.
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The domain of Your beliefs is assumed to be a Boolean algebra of subsets ℜ of Ω. Indeed whenever You can express Your belief that ω 0 belongs to a set A and to a set B, You can also express Your belief that ω 0 belongs to their complement (relative to Ω), union and intersection. We do not assume that ℜ is 2 Ω . Because of Your limited reasoning power, Your beliefs that result from Your evidential corpus at time t are not necessarily so detailed that every subset of Ω can be assigned a belief. In Smets (1995), we further examine the case where the credibility is defined only on a subalgebra Ω' of Ω, in which case the belief holder is not even sure that ω 0 is an element of Ω'. For simplicity's sake, that particular case will not considered here.
We call Ω the frame of discernment (the frame for short). We call the pair (Ω, ℜ) a propositional space.
Doxastic equivalence.
We now introduce the concept of doxastic equivalence, i.e., equivalence relative to the evidential corpus EC t Y .
As an example, suppose You want to decide whether to go to a movie or stay at home tonight. You have decided to toss a coin, if it is heads, You will go to the movie, and if it is tails, You will stay at home. (These are the pieces of evidence in EC t Y ). Then 'heads' and 'going to the movie' are doxastically equivalent as they share the same truth status given what You know at t. Of course, they are not logically equivalent (Kyburg, 1987a) . Logical equivalence implies doxastic equivalence, not the reverse.
Formally, in propositional logic, two propositions p and q defined on L are logically equivalent iff "p' = "q'. They are doxastically equivalent (for You at t, i.e., given EC t Y ) iff the sets of worlds "p' and "q' that denote them share the same worlds among 
Belief functions
We will derive that quantified beliefs are represented by 'belief functions' (Shafer, 1976) . Given a propositional space (Ω, ℜ), a belief function is a function bel from ℜ to [0, 1] such that : 1) bel(Ø) = 0 2) for all A 1 ,A 2 ,...A n ∈ℜ,
Usually, bel(Ω) = 1 is also assumed. It can be ignored and we will only require that bel(Ω) ≤ 1.
Axiomatic justification for the use of belief functions.
Let F denote the set of functions that could be used to quantify someone's beliefs and let us call 'credibility functions' the elements of F. Initially, credibility functions can be any set-function. We then introduce requirements that we feel any measure of belief should satisfy. Each requirement increasingly limits F, up to the point where F reduces itself to the set of belief functions. Even though probability functions are special cases of belief functions, the family of probability functions is not expressive enough to satisfy all requirements (see section 3.5).
The credibility function.
The first requirement states that beliefs are pointwise valued, non negative and monotone for inclusion. That Cr is a pointwise function is not without consequence as it leads to rejecting belief representations based on interval valued probabilities or sets of probability functions (Kyburg, 1987b , 1993 , Voorbraak, 1993 , Levi, 1980 , Waley, 1991 .
We introduce the strong but obvious requirement that propositions doxastically equivalent for You at t receive the same beliefs (Kyburg, 1987a Requirement 2 implies that those subsets of Ω that belong to both algebras will receive the same belief: indeed the propositions that denote them are doxastically equivalent. Hence the belief given to a subset of Ω does not depend on the structure of the algebra to which the subset belongs.
Convexity of the set of credibility functions.
We first accept that probability functions belong to F. This could be either directly assumed, or equivalently derived from the Hacking frequency principle that claims: If Chance(X) = p, then Belief(X) = p. where Chance corresponds to Objective Probability, and Belief to Cr.
Requirement 3: Probability functions are credibility functions.
We then proceed by showing that the linear combination of two credibility functions is a credibility function.
Example 1: The Horse Race. Suppose a horse race involving three horses: Allan, Blues and Carol. Tomorrow at 7 AM, it will be decided depending on the outcome of a coin tossing experiment, if the race will be run at 10 AM or 4 PM. Let α be the probability that the race is run at 10 AM. The time of the race influences Your beliefs about which horse will win. Let Cr 1 and Cr 2 be the credibility functions that describe Your beliefs about which horse will win if the race is run at 10 AM or at 4 PM, respectively. You must buy a ticket now. Let Cr 12 be the credibility function that describes Your beliefs held by now about the winner. We essentially assume that where F α (x,y) is continuous in (x,y)∈[0,1] 2 , strictly monotone for both components and idempotent (F α (x,x) = x).
Under requirements 1, 3 and 4, we prove that:
Thus F is a convex set, a property shared by subjective probability functions and belief functions, but neither by the set of possibility nor by the set of necessity measures. Hence requirements 3 and 4 eliminate possibility and necessity measures for representing beliefs. Coarsening: Let (Ω, ℜ) be a propositional space. A coarsening C is a mapping from ℜ to ℜ", where ℜ" is an algebra also defined on Ω, such that one or several atoms of ℜ are mapped into one atom of ℜ" and each atom of ℜ is mapped into one and only one atom of ℜ".
Uninformative changes of ℜ.
Refinement: Let (Ω, ℜ) be a propositional space. A refinement. R is a mapping from ℜ to ℜ' where ℜ' is an algebra on Ω' such that each atom of ℜ is mapped into one or several atoms of ℜ' and each atom of ℜ' is derived from one and only one atom of ℜ. Let R(A) be the image of A∈ℜ in ℜ', and let R(Ø)=Ø.
The nature of the frames Ω and Ω' is irrelevant to our presentation. The only important components are the algebras. In practice, we can always redefine Ω and Ω' such that the resulting frames are equal.
Coarsenings and refinements are called uninformative if they do not modify the evidential corpus EC t Y held by You at t. Uninformative change fits in with the idea that only the structure of the algebra on which beliefs are held is modified; no further information is added to the evidential corpus.
The uninformative nature of the changes is formalized in the next requirement that states that the credibility function induced by such mappings from an initial credibility function Cr depends only on Cr and the mapping. Cr' = g( Cr, R ) and Cr" = h( Cr, C ).
Uninformative Coarsening.
The derivation of the nature of the h transformation is immediate as illustrated in example 2. The only difference between Cr" and Cr is that Cr provides more detailed information on Ω than Cr". Indeed Cr describes a belief over an algebra ℜ whose granularity is finer. The next theorem is proved by the direct application of the Doxastic Consistency Requirement. Cr"(A) = Cr(C -1 (A)) for all A∈ℜ" (3.2) where C -1 (A) denote the union of the atoms of ℜ which are mapped by C into an atom of A.
Uninformative Refinement.
In requirement 5, some of the values of Cr' are derived by the direct application of the Doxastic Consistency Requirement. But this does not work for the elements of ℜ' that are not the image of some elements of ℜ under R. They will be deduced once we study the conditioning process to which we now turn our attention. We only need one requirement: it states that if an atom of ℜ is refined into a very large number of new atoms in ℜ' by the refinement R, then the credibility given to this new atoms should be very small. by the uninformative refinement R n from (Ω, ℜ) to (Ω, ℜ n ), where R n is so defined that it refines a given atom ω of ℜ into n atoms of ℜ n . Let ω n be one of the atoms of ℜ n that belongs to R n (ω). Then: lim n→∞ Cr n (ω n ) = 0. We introduce the principle of doxastic stability through example 2.
Informative changes of

Example 2 Continued.
Consider the refinement of example 2. Let Cr 0 and Cr 2 denote the credibility function defined on {E, G, F, I} and {E, G, FT, FP, I}, respectively. Two types of conditionings, called generic and factual conditionings, can be considered (Dubois and Prade, 1994) . The first results from an information relative to a set of worlds to which the actual world belongs, the second from an information relative to the actual world itself. For the generic conditioning, suppose You learn that there was no FrenchTuc (FT) at the place where the killing occurred. For the factual conditioning, suppose You had a perfect witness who can only recognize if someone is FT or not. The witness saw the killer, and states that the killer is not FT. Are these two types of conditioning equivalent? As far as You are concerned, they are. Both state that the killer is not FT. For the factual conditioning, the situation would have been different if the killer had been randomly selected from a population and You had learned that the killer was not FT, a good reason for such an event being that the killer is not French, and the resulting probabilistic analysis would be appropriate. Here we are not concerned with a randomly selected killer, but with one killer. And the two pieces of conditioning information are equivalent as far as Your beliefs about the killer's nationality are concerned.
Once You know that the killer is not a FrenchTuc, 'the killer is French' and 'the killer is FrenchPic' are doxastically equivalent. Similarly, Your belief that the killer is German was not affected by the refinement of the French into FP and FT: neither was it affected by the knowledge that the killer was not FT. So: Cr notFT (G) = Cr 2 (G) = Cr 0 (G) .
Similarly, that the killer is 'German or FrenchPic' is doxastically equivalent to the fact that the killer is 'German or French' (as French and FrenchPic are doxastically equivalent once You know the killer is not FrenchTuc). So: Cr notFT ({G, FP}) = Cr 2 ({G, F}) = Cr 0 ({G, F}).
These equalities are natural but must nevertheless be assumed. Formally, we have the next requirement.
Requirement 8: Doxastic Stability.
Let the belief state (Ω, ℜ, Cr, EC 0 ). Let R be an uninformative refinement from ℜ to ℜ'. Let ω be an atom of ℜ, and R(ω) = A∪B where A∩B = Ø, A≠Ø, B≠Ø. Let Ev B be the piece of evidence that states that all atoms in B are impossible and let EC 1 = EC 0 ∪{Ev B }, so R(ω)∪ A = EC 1 Ω. Then under EC 1 , R(X) ∩B and R(X) are doxastically equivalent for every X in ℜ: R(X)∩B = EC 1 R(X).
Gärdenfors (1988) suggests two compelling properties for probabilistic revision functions: homomorphism and preservation, whose meanings are illustrated hereafter.
Example 1 Continued. In the horse race example, suppose that You learn that Carol is a sure loser. You can derive the conditional credibility function either directly from the combined credibility function Cr 12 or from the linear combination of the individual credibility functions Cr 1 and Cr 2 . This requirement would have been satisfied in probability theory if probabilities had not been normalized, i.e., if the axiom P(Ω) = 1 were abandoned, and the Bayesian conditioning rule were P(A|B) = P(A∩B) instead of P(A∩B)/P(B). · The Preservation Requirement asserts essentially that a proposition as much believed as a tautology will be as believed as the conditioning proposition after conditioning. Given requirements 1 to 10, we can establish the exact mathematical relations that represent the impact of both the conditioning and the coarsening processes. Before going on to prove that all credibility functions are belief functions, we consider some of the consequences of requirements 1 to 10, and in particular why probability functions and plausibility functions are inadequate to represent quantified beliefs.
To show that probability functions are not adequate, we consider the problem of iterated uninformative refinements. As an illustrative example, take Ω 0 = {a, b}, Ω 1 = {a, b 1 , b 2 }, and Ω 2 = {a, b 1 , b 21 , b 22 }. Let R 1 be a refinement from (Ω 0 , 2 Ω 0) to (Ω 1 , 2 Ω 1) such that R 1 (a) = {a}, and R 1 (b) = {b 1 , b 2 }. Let R 2 be a refinement from (Ω 1 , 2 Ω 1) to (Ω 2 , 2 Ω 2) such that R 2 (a) = {a}, R 2 (b 1 ) = {b 1 } and R 2 (b 2 ) = {b 21 , b 22 }.
Let the belief state (Ω 0 , 2 Ω 0, Cr 0 , EC 0 ). Let Cr 1 (Cr 2 ) be the credibility function induced from Cr 0 (Cr 1 ) on 2 Ω 1 (2 Ω 2) by the uninformative refinement R 1 (R 2 ).
Consider the refinement R 12 from (Ω, 2 Ω ) to (Ω 2 , 2 Ω 2) such that R 12 (a) = {a}, R 12 (b) = {b 1 , b 21 , b 22 }, and let Cr 12 be the credibility function induced from Cr 0 on 2 Ω 2 by the uninformative refinement R 12 . R 12 is nothing but the result of combining R 1 with R 2 . By the Doxastic Consistency Requirement, Cr 2 = Cr 12 .
In order to achieve such an equality in probability theory, we need to know how The Preservation Requirement is not satisfied by plausibility functions, the dual of the belief functions. This rejection seems adequate because we feel that Cr should behave like the modality used to represent categorical beliefs, i.e., the 'box' operator encountered in doxastic logic. Using plausibility functions to represent quantified beliefs would be equivalent to representing categorical beliefs by the 'diamond' operator. Of course, such an interpretation of categorical 'belief' could be defended. The question is in defining what is meant by beliefs: we follow the classical interpretation described in doxastic logic (Hintikka, 1962 ).
In conclusion, probability functions are not expressive enough to satisfy our requirements, and plausibility functions do not cover our interpretation of the belief modality.
Credibility functions are belief functions.
That belief functions satisfy all requirements 1 to 10 is immediate. The problem is to prove the reverse. We prove it by studying the concept of deconditionalization, i.e., the inverse of the conditioning process, and adding a final requirement. Suppose You had some initial credibility function Cr defined on ℜ and You had conditioned it on Ev X for X∈ℜ, which resulted in the credibility function Cr X . Then You learn that the conditioning on Ev X was inappropriate, i.e., that all the reasons that lead You to condition on Ev X were unjustified. You want to erase the impact of Ev X from Cr X and rebuild a credibility function Cr from which Cr X could have been obtained by its conditioning on Ev X .
Formally, let (Ω, ℜ) be a propositional space. Let Cr be the set of credibility functions defined on ℜ. For X∈ℜ, let Cr X be the set of conditional credibility functions obtained by conditioning the elements of Cr on Ev X by (3.3). The impact of conditioning the elements of Cr on X can be described by an operator S X : Cr→Cr X such that:
Cr X = S X o Cr for all Cr∈Cr S X is a linear operator and is uniquely represented by a matrix operator (Klawonn and Smets, 1992) Consider now the deconditioning operators. The matrix S X is a singular matrix, so it admits only generalized inverses. Let S -X be such an operator. S -X is a generalized inverse of S X and satisfies: S X o S -X o S X = S X . (3.4) The relation translates the idea that re-conditioning after deconditioning annihilates the effect of the deconditioning. Besides S -X is also idempotent: S -X o S -X = S -X (3.5) Indeed, deconditioning twice has the same impact as deconditioning once.
Conclusions.
In conclusion, we have justified the use of belief functions to represent quantified beliefs. The model we obtain corresponds to the transferable belief model, i.e., a model for the representation of beliefs based on belief functions and developed independently of any probabilistic assumption. This is to be contrasted with Dempster's model (Dempster, 1967) that is also based on belief functions, but they are strongly linked to some underlying probability function. Indeed, the belief function derived within Dempster's model on some given space Y results from a one-to-many mapping between a space X and the space Y, and the existence of a probability measure on X. This probability measure imposes constraints that we have not included in our modelization.
Similar reasons hold for the random sets interpretation of belief functions. The model we develop does not require any idea of subjective probability. It is derived directly from general rationality principles unrelated to some underlying probability function, as is the case with the transferable belief model.
The value of the model we derive for representing quantified beliefs can be assessed by analyzing the validity of each requirement and assessing their adequacy. No objective test seems to exist to evaluate normative models for quantified beliefs. Hence the interest of the axiomatic justification we propose.
